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THE CASE FOR RETAINING
THE CORPORATE

AMT

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah*

ROFESSORS Chorvat and Knoll present us with a strong argument for repealing the corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT). 1
In 2001, repeal was recommended by the Joint Committee on Taxation as part of their simplification study, endorsed by the ABA/AICPA/
TEI tax simplification project, and included in a bill passed by the House
of Representatives. 2 Since this issue is likely to arise again, it seems
worthwhile to review the arguments raised by Chorvat and Knoll. Upon
review, none of these arguments seem particularly persuasive; at best,
they make a case for reforming the corporate AMT, not for repealing it.
On the other hand, Chorvat and Knoll understate the case for retaining
the corporate AMT in some form.
In this comment, I will first state the case for retaining the corporate
AMT, possibly with some modifications. I will then review the arguments
for repeal presented by Chorvat and Knoll. Finally, I will discuss how the
corporate AMT can be modified to make it more palatable in light of the
arguments presented by Chorvat and Knoll.
I.

3
THE ARGUMENTS FOR RETENTION

To make the case for the corporate AMT, it is necessary to make the
4
three following assumptions:
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and Director, International Tax LL.M. Program,
the University of Michigan. I would like to thank David Hasen, Doug Kahn, Kyle Logue,
Dan Shaviro, Joel Slemrod, and George Yin for their helpful comments on an earlier version. All errors are mine.
1. Terrence R. Chorvat & Michael S. Knoll, The Case for Repealing the Corporate
Alternative Minimum Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 305 (2002).
2. See J. COMM. ON TAX'N, STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR

SIMPLIFICATION,

PURSUANT

TO

SECTION

8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, JCS-3-01 (Comm. Print 2001);
House Clears $159.4 Billion Economic Stimulus Package by Narrow Margin, 2001 TAX
NOTES TODAY 207-02 (2001); see Treasury Releases Corporate AMT Figures, 2001 TAX
NOTES TODAY 216-14 (2001) (stating the position of the Treasury, which supports repeal).
3. I am not necessarily arguing for retention of the corporate AMT in its present
form. See discussion for a proposed reform, infra Part III. But I do believe some form of
corporate AMT is needed to bolster the corporate tax, and other forms of presumptive
taxation have their own defects. See generally PRESUMPTIVE INCOME TAXATION (Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah ed., 1998).
4. These assumptions represent a political judgment call, which may or may not be
correct. To some extent that is true of all writing on tax reform, but to the extent I am
defending the status quo, I can at least argue that historically these assumptions have
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1. The corporate income tax will continue to be collected;
2. There will be corporate tax preferences granted; and
3. Congress has no way of determining in advance all the ways in
which the corporate tax preferences it grants (or other departures from
book income) can be abused to reduce the corporate income tax base.
The first and second assumptions represent political reality.5 Whatever
the merits of the case, which I will not go into here, we are going to
continue to have a corporate income tax. 6 And given the political power
of specific corporate taxpayers, we are also going to continue to have
corporate tax preferences, despite Chorvat and Knoll's plea (following
many others from Surrey onward) to have fewer or none. 7 Some of these
preferences may even be justified because of their positive externalities
8
or for other reasons.
The third assumption represents a real constraint on Congress and the
IRS. As the corporate tax shelter saga has shown, there is virtually no end
to the ability of well-financed taxpayers and their advisers to find loopholes in the corporate tax. Many of these loopholes use corporate preferences, while others represent a departure from book income. 9
Given these assumptions, it seems perfectly reasonable for Congress to
say the following: "We are going to grant corporations the preferences
they wish for. However, for reasons that we cannot foresee given our
limited information, some of these preferences or other departures from
book income can be abused to undermine the corporate tax base. Therefore, we are going to enact a corporate AMT that will ensure that no
preference we have granted will completely eliminate the tax base."
Allow me to give a couple of examples of how this strategy might work.
The first example relates to an item that is not even limited by the corporate AMT-the corporate interest deduction. In the 1980s, Congress was
concerned that corporate taxpayers may be able to use the interest deduction to completely eliminate their tax liability. In particular, that concern extended to situations when the interest was paid to related parties
and was not taxable to the recipient. Ultimately, that concern led to the
enactment of § 163(j), which limits corporate taxpayers' ability to deduct
interest to tax-exempt related parties if the deduction results in eliminating over half the corporate tax base.' 0 The interest deduction was not
limited per se. Rather, a limit was placed on the ability to use the deducproven correct. My proposal for reform may be no more politically realistic than other
proposals. See infra Part III (proposing reverting to the pre-1989 corporate AMT).
5. Chorvat & Knoll, supra note 1, at 330 (recognizing the political reality of first and
second assumptions).
6. For a preliminary explanation of why I believe the corporate tax is normatively
justified, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive
Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391 (2002).
7. Chorvat & Knoll, supra note 1, at 330-31.
8. This is recognized by Chorvat & Knoll. See id. at 320-21.
9. See generally George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking

a Lesson from History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209 (2001).
10. I.R.C. § 163() (2002).
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tion to eliminate the corporate tax base in non-arm's length situations
and when no revenue was collectible on the interest income. Congress
here used a balancing test between the justification for letting corporations deduct interest expenses and the desire to preserve the corporate
tax base.
Another example is the foreign tax credit, which is designed to eliminate international double taxation.'1 The credit represents a strongly held
and fully justified government policy. However, as a matter of practical
reality, the credit sometimes must be given in situations in which the taxpayer claiming the credit does not bear the economic burden of the foreign tax. 12 In that case, there exists the potential for using a foreign tax,
not borne by the taxpayer, to eliminate U.S. tax liabilities. The IRS has
been only partially successful in limiting this tax shelter. 13 Thus, the corporate AMT places a floor on the ability to use foreign tax credits to
completely eliminate U.S. tax liability, even if it sometimes results in
14
double taxation.
In these and similar cases, a balance is struck between the preferences,
credits, or deductions Congress wishes to grant, frequently for good reasons, and Congress's wish to make sure that these preferences, credits
and deductions do not completely eliminate the corporate income tax
base. The corporate AMT is a reasonable way of achieving this balance,
given the three assumptions stated above. Nothing in Chorvat and Knoll's
discussion counters this fundamental argument.
Furthermore, the corporate AMT has other merits, which are dismissed by Chorvat and Knoll for inadequate reasons. Specifically, these
merits arise in the issue of fairness, the investment in tax-preferred assets,
the issue of tax shelters, and the issue of financial accounting.
A.

THE FAIRNESS ISSUE

Chorvat and Knoll acknowledge that given that the likely incidence of
the corporate tax (and the corporate AMT) is on owners of capital, and
that taxes on capital fall more on the wealthy, the corporate AMT is progressive. 15 However, they argue that a more efficient way to increase
progressivity would be to raise the corporate tax rate.16 This argument
ignores the political difficulty of raising the rate without granting more
preferences that offset any rate increase. In addition, if the corporate
AMT is necessary to prevent widespread evasion of the regular corporate
tax, then any argument for the corporate tax is an argument for the corporate AMT as well.
11.

I.R.C. § 901 (2002).

12. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(f) (2002) (the so-called "technical taxpayer rule").
13. See I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-3 I.R.B. 49. But see Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th
Cir. 2001).
14. I.R.C. § 59(a) (2002).
15. Chorvat & Knoll, supra note 1, at 315-16.
16. Id. at 316.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Furthermore, although from an economic perspective "corporations do
not pay taxes, only people pay taxes," 17 the political reality is that the
public perceives corporations (and not people) as paying taxes. If highly
profitable corporations do not pay any tax, this can undermine the willingness of ordinary people to pay as well. Thus, there is an important
perceived fairness element in retaining the corporate AMT.

B.

INVESTMENT IN TAX-PREFERRED ASSETS

Chorvat and Knoll reject the argument that the corporate AMT is
needed to discourage inefficient over-investment in tax preferred assets,
because it would be more efficient to curtail the preferences instead. 18
But, as the history of the tax preferences debate from Surrey onward has
shown, repealing preferences is politically very hard given the concentrated lobbying power behind each preference and the collective action
problem of opponents of preferences. The corporate AMT may be a poor
second best in this regard, but it may be the only politically feasible solution to rampant, non-justified preferences.

C.

THE TAX SHELTERS ISSUE

Chorvat and Knoll argue that the corporate AMT is not needed to
combat tax shelters because there are other rules to do so, and if the
corporate AMT is perceived as limiting shelters Congress would not
adopt other rules to combat them. 19 However, in reality, the other rules
are insufficient to combat tax shelters, as is the corporate AMT, but both
help in some way. 20 Chorvat and Knoll's argument is like telling a patient
that he must choose between quitting smoking, eating healthy foods and
exercising. All are necessary, none alone is sufficient.

D.

THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING ISSUE

Chorvat and Knoll reject the argument that the corporate AMT helps
improve financial disclosure, because the corporate AMT tracks book income more closely than the regular corporate tax. Thus, management has
an incentive to not inflate financial income because it results in more
AMT being paid. On the contrary, Chorvat and Knoll argue that the
AMT helps corporations like Enron pretend they are paying more tax
21
than they actually are.
I will return to this issue below, but for now I do not find the Enron
example persuasive. First, if a firm wants to cheat, it will cheat, regardless
of the corporate AMT. Second, for each Enron there may be dozens of
firms that are profitable but pay no regular tax because of the disparities
17. Id. at 315.
18. Id. at 316-17.

19. Id. at 317-18. To a certain extent, these two arguments contradict each other.
20. See discussion of the shelter issue infra.
21. Chorvat & Knoll, supra note 1, at 319.
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between tax and book income. 22 For those firms, the ACE adjustment in
the corporate AMT (discussed below) may serve as a partial corrective to
the incentive to further inflate their book profits. Making the corporate
AMT track book income more closely, as suggested below, would help.
II.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR REPEAL

Chorvat and Knoll make four main arguments against the corporate
AMT: (a) The corporate AMT discourages investment; (b) The corporate
AMT misallocates resources; (c) The corporate AMT increases tax compliance costs and complicates tax planning; (d) The corporate AMT is
poor fiscal policy. None of these arguments are persuasive.
A.

DOES

THE CORPORATE

AMT

DISCOURAGE INVESTMENT?

The first argument is that "[t]he corporate AMT discourages affected
firms from investing in plant, equipment and other productive activities"
by (a) reducing the incentives granted by Congress for such investment,
tax rate so that tax advantaged
and (b) reducing the effective marginal
23
investments are made less attractive.
The first point seems incongruous, given that Chorvat and Knoll recommend that Congress cut back on tax preferences. 24 If tax preferences
for investment are misguided, what is wrong with restricting them via the
corporate AMT? Of course, one can always argue that repealing the preferences directly would be better. But, as Stanley Surrey discovered, repealing preferences is very hard given that each preference has a strong
lobby behind it, while the case for a broad-base, low-rate income tax suffers from collective action problems. The corporate AMT was introduced
in 1986 as part of the one instance in recent tax history when the base was
broadened and the rate reduced. Even in 1986, it was realized that restricting preferences further is difficult politically. The corporate AMT
can be viewed as a back-door way of achieving precisely what Chorvat
and Knoll advocate, namely restricting corporate tax preferences.
The second point is even stranger-Chorvat and Knoll are essentially
arguing that it is better to have high rates and steep preferences (i.e., a
narrow base) than a low rate and a broad base, because the preferences
are more effective in a high rate environment. This flies in the face of the
consensus of most tax and public finance experts that low rates on a
broad base is better tax policy because of the reduced incentive to misallocate resources.
Finally, it should be noted that this is an argument against the corporate AMT in its present form, not against any corporate AMT. The prob22. Mihir Desai, The Divergence Between Book and Tax Income, NBER Working Paper 8866, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (James M. Poterba ed., forthcoming 2003);
see Martin A. Sullivan, Study Finds Excess of Book Over Tax Incomes Grew in Late 1990s,
90 TAX NOTES 717, 717 (2001).
23. Chorvat & Knoll, supra note 1, at 320.
24. Id. at 321.
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lem, if it exists, arises from the denial of specific deductions (e.g.,
accelerated depreciation) in the corporate AMT. If it could be shown that
denial of these deductions has a negative impact, they could be reinstated
under the AMT as well.
B.

DOES THE CORPORATE

AMT

MISALLOCATE RESOURCES?

The second argument made by Chorvat and Knoll against the corporate AMT is that "it changes who makes specific investments, the legal
form these investments take, how they are financed, and when they occur
'25
...[and t]hese changes are all economically wasteful.
Unfortunately, Chorvat and Knoll present no empirical evidence for
any of their arguments in this section. Without such evidence, it is difficult to draw policy conclusions. In fact, some of the effects they mention,
such as encouraging firms to use equity rather than debt financing,
counteract other well-known distortions in the tax law, therefore, their
26
impact may be positive.
In addition, as Dan Shaviro has noted, all of these problems can be
fixed by changing the specific form of the corporate AMT. A proposal for
such a change is presented below. 27 There is no reason to throw out the
corporate AMT baby just because of problems caused by specific
bathwater provisions.
C.

COMPLIANCE COSTS AND TAX PLANNING

There is no question that the corporate AMT, like any tax, imposes
costs on taxpayers. The question is, are these costs reasonable in proportion to the revenue raised by the tax?
On first impression, the answer for the corporate AMT would appear
to be negative, because the tax raises little revenue (about $1 billion per
year) at considerable cost ($7.2 billion to $10.4 billion, according to
Chorvat and Knoll's interpretation of Slemrod and Blumenthal). "This
admittedly rough estimate of the cost of complying with the corporate
'28
AMT is several times the revenue raised by the [minimum] tax."
However, this line of analysis ignores the fact, highlighted by Chorvat
and Knoll, that the impact of the corporate AMT may be much broader
than the revenue numbers indicate since it may increase tax collections
from firms that end up paying the regular corporate tax, "[o]ver onequarter of all corporate assets were held by companies paying higher
25. Id. at 321.
26. Id. at 322.
27. Daniel Shaviro, Tax Simplification and the Alternative Minimum Tax, 91 TAX
NOTES 1455, 1467 (2001).

28. Chorvat & Knoll, supra note 1, at 324-25 (discussing Joel B. Slemrod & Marsha

Blumenthal, The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Big Business, 24 Pui3. FIN. Q. 411
(1996)).
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taxes [in 1998] due to the AMT. ' '29 Assume for the moment that these
firms pay about one-quarter of corporate tax revenues. In that case, since
the cost of the corporate AMT (up to $10.4 billion) is about 25% of the
cost of the corporate tax ($40.3 billion), and if the AMT results in about a
billion being collected, the
quarter of the corporate tax revenues of $200
30
cost of the AMT appears quite reasonable.
Of course, $50 billion could be an overstatement of the revenue saved
by the corporate AMT if the firms in the GAO study pay less in tax than
they hold in assets. But, it could also be an underestimate of the revenues
saved by the corporate AMT if, as argued below, the corporate AMT acts
as a significant brake on corporate tax shelters.
Finally, some of the compliance costs of the corporate AMT could be
reduced if the tax were simplified in the ways suggested below. In particular, the need to calculate the ACE adjustment separately would be obviated if the AMT were based directly on book income. This is consistent
3
with the recommendation of Slemrod and Blumenthal's respondents. '
D.

THE COUNTER-CYCLICAL ARGUMENT

The final argument made by Chorvat and Knoll against the corporate
AMT is a familiar one; the corporate AMT is counter-cyclical, because it
increases collections during recessions and decreases them during
booms. 32 It is not clear that the corporate AMT can have a significant
effect on the business cycle; as Chorvat and Knoll recognize, most taxes
do not. 33 But, even if it can, the correct response is a temporary suspension during recession, not abolition. Moreover, as Shaviro has argued,
AMT can be eliminated
the counter-cyclical character of the corporate
34
with relatively minor changes to the tax.
29. Id. at 307 (alteration in original) (quoting Treasury Releases Data on the Corporate
Alternative Minimum Tax, PO-762, Nov. 6, 2001). Note that this is not the same as "paying
higher AMT."
30. Where the regular corporate tax and corporate AMT liabilities are close, the corporate AMT can result in significant regular tax collections while appearing to raise no
revenue. Suppose corporation X can deduct some item for regular tax purposes but not for
AMT. It has 100 gross income and 40 of the relevant deduction, so its regular tax liability is
100 - 40 = 60 x 0.35 = 21. Its AMT liability is 100 x 0.2 =20, so it pays the regular tax of 21.
Result: no revenue from AMT. At this point the corporation has no incentive to try to
increase its deduction from this item, because if, for example, it had 50 of the deduction, it
would have regular tax liability of 100 - 50 = 50 x 0.35 = 17.5, and would have to pay AMT
of 20. But if the AMT were repealed, it could freely try to increase its deduction-at the
extreme to 100, so its tax liability would be 100 - 100 - 0 x 0.35 = 0. So even though the
AMT in this case raises no revenue, it saves 21 of regular tax revenue. This analysis can, for
example, apply to the difference between accelerated and straight line depreciation. Another example would be if the value of stock granted upon exercise of employee stock
options were not deductible for AMT purposes, as some have proposed (currently, this
deduction wipes out the tax liability of corporations like Intel on U.S. source income). See
Desai, supra note 22.
31. Chorvat & Knoll, supra note 1, at 323-26.
32. Id. at 326.
33. Id. at 326-27.
34. Shaviro, supra note 27, at 1458.
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HOW TO IMPROVE THE CORPORATE AMT

Chorvat and Knoll make two proposals in their article on how to replace the corporate AMT. The first is to restrict corporate preferences
when they do not have redeeming social value. 35 This is a laudable goal
but politically unrealistic-even the tax expenditure budget did not help.
The second is to improve disclosure by making corporations state how
much regular tax they pay. 36 That may influence some highly visible corporations to actually pay more, but I doubt it-in today's political climate, paying less tax in the interest of shareholders can be perceived as a
virtue. Nor will disclosure help with the tax shelter problem-the IRS has
all the information and still lags behind the tax shelter phenomenon.
Retaining the corporate AMT can, however, have a significant positive
impact on the corporate tax shelter problem. This problem has been getting worse recently as the government begins to lose major shelter cases
on appeal. 37 But, it is likely to get even worse if the corporate AMT is
38
repealed, because of the impact of the ACE adjustment.
A little history is in order. The ACE adjustment replaced the book
income adjustment that was part of the corporate AMT from 1986 to
1989. Instead of tying corporate AMT to book income, it ties it to "adjusted current earnings," which are based on earnings and profits. Earnings and profits are, of course, distinguishable from book income, but
they are still closer to book income than to taxable income (for regular
tax purposes).
Professor George Yin has suggested that the solution to the corporate
tax shelter problem may be to tax public corporations on their book income, as is common in other countries. 39 The obvious advantage of such
a proposal is that corporate managers have an incentive to increase book
income, which translates into earnings per share and affects both the
stock price and their compensation. Thus, the incentives of management
restrict their tendency to reduce taxable income. This incentive generally
overcomes the conservative nature of book accounting, which is the
usual explanation for why book accounting should not be used for tax
40
purposes.
It may be no accident that the repeal of the book income adjustment
for corporate AMT purposes in 1989 was followed by a huge increase in
35. Chorvat & Knoll, supra note 1, at 315 n.44, 330-31.
36. Id. at 331-32.

37. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1019 (11th Cir. 2001); IES
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
38. I.R.C. § 56(g) (2002).
39. Yin, supra note 9, at 224-29; see also George K. Yin, Using Book Earnings as the
Default Tax Base for Public Corporations,92 TAX NOTES 135 (2001). But see Lee Sheppard, Corporate Tax Shelters: Red Herrings and Real Solutions, 91 TAX NOTES 2075 (2001).
40. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522 (1979) (not one of Justice Black-

mun's better tax decisions).
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the disparity between book and taxable income in the 1990s. 41 The discrepancy is only partially accounted for by the different treatment of
stock options, which are deductible when exercised for tax purposes but
not for book purposes, and by other obvious differences such as deferral
of foreign source income. 42 One therefore suspects that part of the dis43
crepancy is due to corporate tax shelters.
The ACE adjustment serves as a partial limit to this trend, since it requires corporations to calculate their AMT based in part on adjusted
earnings and profits-a measure closer to book income than to taxable
income. Tax payments by corporations currently average about 20% of
book income-down from about 30% after the 1986 Tax Reform Act,
and approximately the same as before the 1986 Act. 44 Coincidentally or
not, 20% is also the current rate of the corporate AMT. 45
If the corporate AMT were repealed, there would be no more limits to
the ability of corporate management to reduce taxable income to zero
while reporting high book income for EPS purposes. Corporate tax sheltering activity would presumably increase, and with it transactional complexity and litigation activity-precisely the opposite effect from what
true simplification seeks to achieve.
However, the current corporate AMT is an imperfect tool in this regard, because the ACE adjustment is not based directly on book profits.
Instead, it requires corporations to calculate income in three ways-for
financial accounting, for regular corporate tax, and for the ACE. As
Chorvat and Knoll argue, this is unnecessarily wasteful. 46 1 would suggest
reverting to the pre- 1989 version of the corporate AMT and making corporations pay AMT on their book income.
Basing the corporate AMT on book income has several advantages.
First, it aligns managerial incentives with those of shareholders and society; the price for inflating financial profit is paying more tax.
Second, it addresses some of the problems identified by Chorvat and
Knoll with the current corporate AMT. Since there would be no direct
relationship between the corporate AMT and tax preferences, basing the
AMT solely on book income would mitigate any negative or distortionary
effect on those preferences. And since corporations have to calculate
book income anyway, it would reduce the compliance costs of the corporate AMT significantly.
41. Martin A. Sullivan, Study Finds Excess of Book Over Tax Income Grew in Late
1990s, 90 TAX NOTES 717 (Feb. 5, 2001); Desai, supra note 22. It would be interesting to
conduct an empirical study on the effects of the repeal of the book income adjustment on

corporate tax revenues.
42. Desai, supra note 22; see I.R.C. § 83(h) (2002), Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, SFAS No. 123; Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees, APB No. 25.
43. Desai, supra note 22.
44. This is just one of the many ways in which the 1986 Act has been reversed by
recent developments. The tax rates have increased, the base has shrunk, the capital gains
preference has been reintroduced, and we are back in the pre-1986 mess.
45. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(B)(i) (2002).
46. Chorvat & Knoll, supra note 1, at 313.
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Third, basing the corporate AMT on book income acts as a break on
the corporate tax shelter phenomenon, in the ways identified by George
Yin.

47

IV.

CONCLUSION

The corporate AMT is a low-rate, broad-based tax on corporations. As
such, it would typically be considered preferable to the higher-rate, narrower-base regular corporate tax. So why not just repeal the regular tax?
The answer, of course, is revenue; the corporate AMT standing by itself would not raise the $200 billion raised by the regular corporate tax.
So the solution is to retain the corporate AMT but raise its rate to 35%
(or so), while abolishing the corporate tax. Alternatively, one could do
what Chorvat and Knoll propose: Keep the regular tax at 35%, but make
it more like the corporate AMT by abolishing all the preferences.
Unfortunately, in my opinion, none of these proposals are politically
feasible. Nor is George Yin's proposal to just have a regular corporate tax
based on book income. 48 In the foreseeable future, we are going to have a
regular corporate tax with preferences, and Congress will be unable to
prevent taxpayers from finding loopholes in it. In those second or thirdbest circumstances, retaining the corporate AMT is the best solution.
However, it can be improved and simplified, primarily by basing it more
on book income in the way proposed above.

47. Yin, supra note 9.
48. Id.

